The recent official visit by the EU delegation most likely was a face-saving gesture, as business delegations set a frenzy of deals after the post-pandemic reopening of the Chinese economy. It is hard to take a solid political stance when the interests of European Union member countries are better served by increasing trade relations with China.

From a defence perspective, the EU is determined to support NATO as a guarantee of security in the region. On the other hand, China is trying to destabilize the region with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, which in practicality has been questioned on many occasions as the majority of projects have failed or been frozen. Smaller countries, such as Montenegro, have been a prime example of this as they have spent more than $1 billion on building a 41 km long highway, something of a debt trap marred with corruption, especially in a country with a small, declining GDP.

The risks of the venture on the other hand have slowly been passed on to EU banks and lending institutions. By the same token, Beijing’s use of economic coercion in Lithuania was another wake-up call for the EU. In 2021, Lithuania opened the Taiwanese Representative Office, leading to a fierce backlash which included economic sanctions, goods being boycotted and diplomatic relations being downgraded by China. While the EU Parliament has proposed tools to counter such reactions, the reality shows that nothing has been implemented currently. The Czech Republic has also shown solidarity with Taiwan, as it believes that China is fundamentally incompatible with Western democratic values. Slovakia and Poland are also key supporters in the shift towards Taiwan as fatigue in relations with China deepen in Europe. It is currently unclear to what extent similar moves are simply a political tactic to irritate China. At the same time, given the EU trade relations with China, there are several EU member nations, such as Hungary, which are still a solid proponent of China – and Russia, for that matter – and seeking to deepen bilateral ties. 

Moscow on the other hand has been threatening to place tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus to target NATO, something that could impact EU-China relations as the primary premise of China trading with the EU has always been that it will play a stabilising influence on Russia. The precarious balancing act wherein China tries to deepen trade ties with the EU while supporting the Russia-Ukraine conflict is likely to destabilise over the coming months. Beijing’s current actions seem to indicate that its primary goal, when it comes to EU relations, is to encourage Europe to stay out of its strategic competition with the US. Contradicting the EU position and blaming the Russia-Ukraine conflict on NATO expansion has been clearly stated by China. The new era that China seeks to realize in partnership with Russia is fundamentally opposed to EU needs for security along its borders. As a result, any diplomatic stunts that China undertakes when it comes to talks with Ukraine are not to be believed and will only paralyse EU efforts to reduce China’s impact on the Ukraine conflict. 

Another point of concern for the EU over the coming months is the test of its cybersecurity capabilities. There is a huge lack of unity among member states when it comes to opposing Chinese interference in their internal politics. The information manipulation and security risks in Europe are massive, there is a growing need to map risks systemically and build tools for defending against China when it comes to destabilizing the politics of the region. Restriction on high-tech exports to and from China are likely to be another factor when it comes to testing the cybersecurity capabilities of Europe as China tries to hack their way into developing their own capabilities. The EU is currently dependent on China for 90% of its rare earth metal needs, with implications that are particularly relevant when it comes to defining the timeline for any strategic reset of the relationship with China. 

Until there are enough guarantees of withstanding shocks, the EU is likely to have meaningless talks with China over Ukraine. On the other hand, China will try to deepen such dependencies to prolong the struggle as it benefits from Russia due to the conflict. Beijing will inevitably react when it comes to Taiwan deepening its ties to the United States and the EU needs to have the tools and will-power ready in order to have any meaningful change in China’s Russia policy. If the EU intercedes in Taiwan, China is likely to interpret such action as siding with the US. Being unwilling to face such a multi-polar world is one of the ways to get it to change its mind on Russia and focus on its own interests, particularly when it comes to economic recovery.

On the other hand, lack of intervention is likely to fuel Chinese aggression and convince it that its ambitions of setting up a new world order that is not US-led are correct. Regardless of the outcome, real or perceived weaknesses by the EU are detrimental to its own business interests. However, the sad reality is that Chinese influence in the EU is already strong enough to stop consensus-building internally. Such an outcome is guaranteed to ensure that EU-China relations will deteriorate in the coming future.